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BOOK NOTICE
Some Kind of Judge:
Henry Friendly and the Law of Federal Courts
Aaron P. Brecher*
Henry Friendly, Greatest Judge of His Era. By David M. Dorsen. Fore-
word by Richard A. Posner. Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press. 2012. Pp. xiii, 498. $35.
Introduction
Überfans of the federal judiciary owe a lot to David Dorsen.1 His illumi-
nating biography of Judge Henry Friendly is a fitting tribute to the contribu-
tions of a jurist that many consider to be among the finest judges never to sit
on the U.S. Supreme Court. Judicial biography is a difficult genre to do
well,2 and most authors choose to focus on Supreme Court justices.3 But
Henry Friendly, Greatest Judge of His Era is an excellent source of informa-
tion on Friendly’s life and, far more important, his views on the law and his
relationships with some of the most fascinating figures in twentieth-century
legal history.
Dorsen not only provides a detailed study of Friendly’s life and career
but he also uses the biography as a vehicle to explore the ways judges decide
cases, the work of intermediate appellate courts, and Friendly’s particular
influence across many legal fields (p. 2). Dorsen devotes much of the book
to demonstrating that Friendly was a “great” judge along a number of
dimensions: his intelligence, productivity, professional accomplishments,
approach to legal questions, and influence on the law (pp. 2–3). Dorsen
contends that the “influence of a circuit judge on the development of federal
law depends largely on whether other federal judges view his work as worth
* Law Clerk, Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler, U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California. I thank the entire staff of the Michigan Law Review, especially Jeff
Edwards, Julian Kleinbrodt, and Dayna Zolle, for their thoughtful and diligent editing.
Professor Eve Brensike Primus and Varun Behl provided invaluable comments on earlier
drafts. As always, I am grateful to my family. This Notice is dedicated to all those members of
the federal judiciary whose service, like Judge Friendly’s, merits the designation “honorable.”
1. Of Counsel, Sedgwick LLP, Washington, D.C.
2. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 502, 510–19 (1995)
(arguing that judicial biographies are not only difficult to write effectively but also rarely
worth the effort of having done so).
3. For some of the best of these, see Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo (2000); Seth
Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan (2010); and Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D.
Brandeis (2009). Prominent biographies of lower court judges include Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand (2d ed. 2011), and Polly J. Price, Judge Richard S. Arnold (2009).
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emulating. On that criterion, as well as others, Friendly demands attention”
(p. 2).
Part I of this Notice briefly summarizes Dorsen’s work, recounting the
key facts of Friendly’s life, his approach to judging, and those areas of the
law most affected by Friendly’s ideas. It concludes that Dorsen has indeed
demonstrated Friendly’s “greatness” to a certain degree. Part II explores
Dorsen’s notion of influence on the law by examining Friendly’s impact on
an area of law in which he was widely considered expert: federal jurisdiction.
It expands Dorsen’s conception of influence to include not only the extent to
which subsequent judges have emulated Friendly but also the extent to
which Friendly was a clear and forceful expounder of ideas that shaped the
terms of the debate on issues of federal jurisdiction, even if his vision did
not ultimately carry the day. Moreover, the relevant evaluators of influence
should include Congress and academics in addition to other judges.
I. “Man for All Seasons in the Law”4
Henry Jacob Friendly was born in 1903 to a comfortably middle-class
Jewish family in Elmira, New York (p. 6). In New York City in 1986, losing
his sight and still mourning his wife Sophie’s death a year earlier, he com-
mitted suicide (p. 343). The years between these two events were marked by
superlative academic and professional achievements juxtaposed against
chronic bouts of melancholy, difficult relationships in his family life, and the
cultivation of a famously gruff demeanor with subordinates and the lawyers
who appeared before him. This Part focuses on Friendly’s academic life and
work as a judge.
Friendly’s pre-judicial career would have been something to be proud of
even if he had never ascended to the bench. After studying history at
Harvard College, he attended Harvard Law School where he compiled one of
the best, possibly the best, academic records in the school’s history5 and
served as president of the Harvard Law Review (pp. 12–27). Afterward,
Friendly worked for Justice Brandeis as a clerk—a position for which
4. The third edition of the leading casebook on federal jurisdiction was dedicated to
Friendly, calling him “man for all seasons in the law; master of this subject.” Paul M. Bator
et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System xix (3d ed.
1988). Apparently the admiration was mutual. Friendly cited the Hart and Wechsler casebook
twenty-seven times as a judge. P. 78. In an episode that might elicit a chuckle from students
who have taken a course in Federal Courts, Friendly read the first edition while awaiting his
confirmation in 1959 and later wrote that “[t]he book, while not exactly summer reading,
proved to be the most stimulating and exciting law book [he] had encountered since
Wigmore’s Evidence.” P. 78 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Herbert Wechsler, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 974, 974 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). One doubts that many
outside the federal jurisdiction professoriate—or indeed, within it—have read Hart and
Wechsler from cover to cover and found it “exciting.”
5. Brandeis’s average at Harvard Law was somewhat higher than Friendly’s, but scholars
disagree over who had the best academic record in the school’s history because the grading
system changed between Brandeis’s graduation in 1877 and Friendly’s attendance fifty years
later. P. 27.
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Friendly’s teacher Felix Frankfurter had selected him (pp. 26–27). Upon
completing his clerkship, Friendly practiced law at Root, Clark, Buckner &
Ballantine before leaving to found his own firm in 1946 with a number of
other partners (pp. 1, 31–33, 50–51). That firm evolved into Cleary, Got-
tlieb, Steen & Hamilton, which remains a Wall Street powerhouse today.6
Friendly’s successful practice prompted his ascent as one of the most
respected lawyers in the country as he developed an impressive portfolio of
clients. This portfolio included Pan American Global Airways, for which he
served as a vice president and general counsel while in practice (p. 60).
Dorsen covers all of this in fewer than eighty pages. The heart of the
biography describes Friendly’s contributions as a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. President Eisenhower appointed Friendly to
the bench in 1959, and over the next twenty-seven years, Friendly wrote over
1,000 opinions, as well as dozens of book reviews and scholarly articles (pp.
1–3). Dorsen devotes chapters to specific time periods or themes, describ-
ing, for example, Friendly’s relationships with his fellow judges (Chapter
Seven) and his clerks (Chapter Six), and he later covers Friendly’s death
(Chapter Twenty-four) and legacy (Chapter Twenty-five). But Dorsen or-
ganizes the bulk of the book by area of law rather than chronologically,
detailing Friendly’s most significant opinions and other writings in a num-
ber of fields. Friendly was particularly famous for his contributions to ad-
ministrative law,7 federal jurisdiction,8 securities law,9 and criminal
procedure.10
Readers less concerned with particular doctrinal areas might be inter-
ested in Dorsen’s description of the judge’s interactions with some of the
most important people in American legal history. In addition to formative
encounters with Frankfurter and Brandeis early in his career, Friendly also
worked closely with John Marshall Harlan II, who was a partner at Root,
Clark (pp. 38–41) and later became the great dissenter of the Warren Court.
And Learned Hand was among those who urged Eisenhower to appoint
Friendly to the Second Circuit.11
6. See Firm Profiles: Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Am.Law., http://www.american
lawyer.com/firmProfile.jsp?name=Cleary+Gottlieb+Steen+%26+Hamilton (last updated Jan.
1, 2012). Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Root, Clark. The firm went through a
number of name changes and mergers before eventually becoming Dewey & Leboeuf, p. 1,
whose 2012 dissolution was the largest law firm collapse in U.S. history, see Jennifer Smith,
Dewey Defied ‘Law of Jungle’, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 2012, at B6, available at http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10000872396390443624204578056664157840752.html.
7. See A. Raymond Randolph, Administrative Law and the Legacy of Henry J. Friendly,
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1999).
8. See David P. Currie, On Blazing Trails: Judge Friendly and Federal Jurisdiction, 133 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 5, 5 (1984); see also infra Part II.
9. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Crea-
tion of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 777, 780–81 (1997).
10. See Frank I. Goodman, Judge Friendly’s Contributions to Securities Law and Criminal
Procedure: “Moderation Is All”, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 10, 23–25 (1984).
11. P. 75; see also Gunther, supra note 3, at 558–60. Frankfurter had introduced
Friendly to Hand when Friendly was still a law student. P. 25. Later, Friendly’s first few years
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During his career, Friendly won the respect of colleagues, academics,
and Supreme Court justices for his judicial work (pp. 354–57). Friendly’s
opinions demonstrated excellent writing, command of the facts, modera-
tion, and creativity in advancing the law while still respecting statutory and
constitutional language and controlling precedents.12 The judge was cer-
tainly more restrained and respectful of precedent than some of his famous
judicial contemporaries.13 This approach apparently earned him many ad-
mirers, evidenced by the accolades that poured in from many quarters of the
legal world when he died (pp. 344, 354–56).
Dorsen’s book as a whole highlights Friendly’s ability to succeed as a
private attorney, a judge, and a scholar14—three fields that are rarely all
mastered by one person. In recent decades, a number of federal judges have
lamented “the alienation of the elite law professor from legal practice, in-
cluding judging.”15 Friendly was an exception. The academy took his articles
and opinions seriously, and Friendly displayed an appreciation for academic
contributions to legal thought.16
Dorsen contends that Friendly’s greatest legacy might be the accom-
plishments of his law clerks (p. 357). Although Friendly was notoriously
demanding of his clerks (indeed, he was often remarkably insensitive),17
there is little doubt that the clerkship experience deeply enriched many of
his clerks’ professional lives.18 An appendix to Dorsen’s book contains a
complete list of Friendly’s former clerks, and their credentials are impressive
on the Second Circuit coincided with Hand’s last years, and Friendly had the opportunity to
sit on a panel with Hand early in the former’s first year as a judge. Pp. 82–83, 100.
12. See pp. 347–48; Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitu-
tional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 975, 981–82 (2007).
13. Compare Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging, 159 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 3–4 (2010) (observing that Friendly “took precedent extremely seriously” and noting
Friendly’s views on the differences between the role of supreme courts and intermediate appel-
late courts), with G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition 246 (3d ed. 2007)
(“[California Supreme Court Justice Traynor’s] model assumed that judges were lawmakers
and found activist, innovative judging compatible with that assumption.”). This apparent dif-
ference in opinion did not prevent Friendly from expressing deep admiration for Traynor. See
Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1039 (1983). Moreover,
Friendly himself was not always opposed to judicial lawmaking. See infra Section II.A.
14. There is certainly value in a lawyer’s ability to master different roles within the pro-
fession. Cf. Wade H. McCree, Jr., Partners in a Process: The Academy and the Courts, 37 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1041 (1980) (contending that lawyers, judges, and academics are partners in the
process of shaping law).
15. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 205 (2008); see also Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34,
34–38 (1992).
16. See Posner, supra note 15, at 208.
17. Dorsen recounts incidents of this tendency. For example, Friendly once insisted that
someone hand John Roberts some briefs while the latter was stuck in the court elevator so that
he would not waste time. Friendly apparently expected another clerk to report for work the
day after the clerk’s wife gave birth. Pp. 107–09.
18. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 202–03
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to say the least. Many, including Bruce Ackerman, Philip Bobbitt, and Larry
Kramer, entered the legal academy.19 Seven became federal judges, including
Chief Justice John Roberts (p. 357).
Dorsen successfully makes his case that Friendly was a great judge—
whether measured in terms of intellectual ability, accomplishments, or the
evaluation of mentors, peers, and capable law clerks. But he also explores
Friendly’s influence, suggesting that it rests in large part on the extent to
which other judges have emulated him. The next Part looks at this issue
more closely, examining Friendly’s influence on the law of federal courts.
II. “Master of This Subject”20
Friendly was renowned for his expertise on the law of federal jurisdic-
tion,21 an interest that may have been sparked by early mentors like Frank-
furter22 and Brandeis.23 Dorsen devotes a chapter to Friendly’s views on each
of the following subjects: jurisdiction, federal common law, and habeas
corpus. This Part looks at these three areas through a different lens to pro-
pose a broader view of Friendly’s influence that is measured less in emula-
tion by other judges and more in the respect that judges and legislators give
to Friendly’s ideas, even when they disagree. With this expanded conception,
Friendly appears even more influential than Dorsen suggests. This Part be-
gins with a discussion of federal common law in Section II.A. Section II.B
considers the reception to Friendly’s thoughts on the role of federal courts
in collateral review of state criminal convictions. Finally, Section II.C dis-
cusses Friendly’s lack of success in advocating for the virtual elimination of
diversity as a source of federal jurisdiction.
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“[Friendly] had such a total commitment to excel-
lence in his craft at every stage of the process, just a total devotion to the rule of law . . . . He
was an absolute genius. . . . To this day, lawyers will say, when they get into an area of the law
and they pick up one of his opinions, that you can look at it and it’s like having a guide to the
whole area of the law.”); Bruce A. Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1709 (1986). Judge Michael Boudin, Friendly’s favorite clerk, p. 109, has written a num-
ber of articles celebrating his former boss. See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Friendly, J., Dissenting, 61
Duke L.J. 881 (2012); Boudin, supra note 13.
19. Appendix A, pp. 362–66. See generally p. 357.
20. See supra note 4 (noting that the third edition of Hart and Wechsler’s casebook on
federal jurisdiction called Friendly “master of this subject”). This was also the phrase Friendly
used to describe Henry Hart’s relationship to the field. Henry J. Friendly, Federal
Jurisdiction 4 (1973).
21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
22. Friendly wrote that Frankfurter had “revealed the fascinations of federal jurisdiction”
to him. Friendly, supra note 20, at Acknowledgments.
23. Brandeis, author of the Court’s landmark jurisdiction opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), had long been considered an expert on the subject. “A Solicitor
General once told the lawyer George Farnum that ‘when Mr. Justice Brandeis writes an opin-
ion dealing with a question of federal practice, the law is settled for fifty years to come.’ ”
Urofsky, supra note 3, at 610 (quoting George R. Farnum, Some Men of the Law 28
(1941)).
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A. Federal Common Law
In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that
federal courts must apply the substantive decisional law of state courts when
deciding issues of state law.24 Brandeis’s opinion famously concluded that
“[t]here is no federal general common law.”25 In a lecture defending Bran-
deis’s decision, Friendly “craft[ed] the template for the modern view of fed-
eral common law.”26 In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common
Law,27 Friendly’s lecture, which was subsequently published as an article by
the New York University Law Review, is one of the most cited28 and most
important law review articles ever written.29 Friendly claimed that in addi-
tion to its generally sound legal reasoning, Erie had usefully paved the way
for specialized pockets of federal common law that would be binding on the
states via the Supremacy Clause.30
Friendly’s lecture provided a vigorous defense of the underpinnings of
Erie, which had faced substantial criticism over the years. It also celebrated
the openings that Erie and subsequent cases left for creating binding federal
common law—a “tool incalculably useful to our federal system.”31 In partic-
ular, Friendly noted the emergence of federal judicial lawmaking with regard
to the obligations of the United States,32 interpretation of federal labor con-
tracts,33 unfair competition affecting interstate commerce,34 regulation of in-
terstate carriers,35 and implied private rights of action.36 Friendly praised
these doctrinal developments37 and suggested that creating federal common
law was appropriate whenever Congress or constitutional structure indicated
24. 304 U.S. at 78.
25. Id. The same day, the Court, again speaking through Brandeis, decided that ques-
tions of rights in interstate streams were governed by federal common law binding on the
states. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). Thus
Erie did not kill federal common law but merely limited the scope of its application.
26. Boudin, supra note 12, at 995.
27. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 383 (1964).
28. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time,
110 Mich. L. Rev. 1483, 1491 tbl.1 (2012) (ranking Friendly’s article as the seventy-seventh
most cited law review article).
29. See Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective: Most Influential Articles, 75 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1517, 1534–35 (2000) (reviewing Friendly, supra note 27) (John E. Sexton describing the
Erie article as “one of the classics of American legal scholarship”).
30. Friendly, supra note 27, at 405.
31. Id. at 383–405, 421.
32. Id. at 409.
33. Id. at 412–14.
34. Id. at 414.
35. Id. at 416–17.
36. Id. at 421.
37. Id. at 405, 421–22.
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that the matter was one of national concern,38 such as foreign affairs.39
Friendly won plaudits for the clarity of his ideas, which, while not entirely
original, usefully and persuasively framed the issue of federal common law
(p. 303). His views provided tremendous value to other judges confronting
the issue.40
But Friendly’s views also proved controversial within the academy.41
Many scholars have questioned the propriety of judicial lawmaking in the
face of a constitutional structure that grants Congress primary lawmaking
authority.42 In addition to scholars who are solely concerned with separation
of powers itself, scholars who view the separation of powers as a constitu-
tional feature that serves to protect federalism43 may also feel squeamish
about a freewheeling approach to federal judges making law. But to the ex-
tent that Friendly’s position has inspired scholarly debate, that debate, and
not just the acceptance of Friendly’s approach, is a measure of his influence.
Several decades ago, the Supreme Court seemed fairly open to citing
Friendly in support of a holding that federal common law governed an is-
sue.44 But more recently, the justices have been less receptive to such
claims.45 For example, although Friendly noted that finding an implied pri-
vate right of action in a federal statute is a useful application of federal
common law,46 the Court has moved from a position fairly solicitous of
private rights of action47 to one that is more restrictive; today, the Court will
38. See id. at 405, 407–08, 408 n.119.
39. Id. at 408 n.119. Friendly suggested in a later update of his Erie lecture that the use of
federal common law in foreign affairs matters was likely to be expansive. Henry J. Friendly,
In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, in Benchmarks 155, 181 n.119
(1967).
40. John Minor Wisdom, Views of a Friendly Observer, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 63, 64 (1984).
41. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263,
263–64 (1992).
42. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 Green Bag 2d 191, 196–97,
200–01 (2007) (noting that the difficulty of enacting legislation ensures broad democratic
support for those laws that are enacted); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace
L. Rev. 327, 332 (1992) (arguing that the judicial power cannot include the power to legislate
because the legislative power belongs to Congress).
43. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L.
Rev. 1321, 1323, 1403 (2001).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 & n.17, 727 (1979)
(citing Friendly, supra note 27, and holding that federal law must govern the priority of liens
that stem from federal lending programs). In total, the Court has cited In Praise of Erie in ten
of its decisions (as of a March 25, 2013, Westlaw search), most recently in American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535–37 (2011) (acknowledging courts’ power to
create specialized federal common law but holding that the Clean Air Act has displaced any
equitable remedy against carbon emitters created by federal common law).
45. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535–37.
46. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
47. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689–709 (1979) (reviewing several availa-
ble private rights of action).
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only find such a right in the face of the clearest evidence of legislative
intent.48
Another example of judicial reluctance to overreach in crafting federal
common law is in the field of foreign affairs, traditionally an uncontroversial
domain of judicial lawmaking even absent a legislative delegation.49
Friendly’s views implied a broad judicial lawmaking power in foreign af-
fairs,50 and for a time, it appeared that the Court had reached similar con-
clusions.51 But in recent years, both the Court and academic commentators
have pushed back. Because of the preeminence of the elected branches in
foreign affairs, the Court now appears reluctant to create substantive rules
without some clear indication from Congress that it is appropriate.52 In Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court cited Friendly’s article in noting its authority
to create common law in areas of traditional federal concern, but it reasoned
that the general practice was not to exercise “innovative authority over sub-
stantive law” without legislative guidance.53 The Sosa Court declined to in-
corporate less than clearly established customary international law into
those claims that can serve as a private cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute.54
If Friendly’s influence were only a measure of the extent to which judges
have emulated him, regard for federal common law might seem a counterex-
ample to Dorsen’s underlying thesis. Judges and academics, however, con-
tinue to cite and wrestle with Friendly, which demonstrates his lasting
influence.
B. Habeas Corpus
Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is a means of challenging in
federal court the lawfulness of detention based on state court criminal con-
victions.55 The Supreme Court doctrine that prevailed during Friendly’s ca-
reer allowed for the fairly wide availability of federal habeas corpus review
48. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (applying a more stringent
test for finding an implied private right of action in statutory language).
49. See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 507
(2006).
50. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Republic of Iraq v. First Nat’l City
Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.) (“It is fundamental to our constitutional
scheme that in dealing with other nations the country must speak with a united voice.”).
51. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–28 (1964).
52. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (noting that even in foreign
relations, the Court has generally looked for congressional guidance before crafting substantive
rules); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 861 (1997) (arguing that
separation of powers cautions against broad judicial lawmaking power in the foreign affairs
field).
53. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 & n.17.
54. Id. at 724–25.
55. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 15.1 (6th ed. 2012).
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for state prisoners.56 Those worried about proper respect for state processes
at the federal level might understandably be anxious about federal habeas
corpus review.
In an influential article published in 1970, Friendly laid out his own
concerns, which grew out of both this wide availability of review as well as
the Warren Court’s expansions of constitutional protections for state crimi-
nal defendants.57 Building on an article on the importance of finality by
Professor Bator,58 Friendly proposed a path for reform: a refocus on inno-
cence as the major criterion for determining the appropriateness of habeas
review. Friendly’s argument, that “with a few important exceptions, convic-
tions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supple-
ments his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence,”59 has had
a significant impact on the subsequent development of the law, and habeas
corpus scholarship has discussed this idea ever since.60 Indeed, habeas
corpus may be the area of federal courts law in which the current doctrine
most closely resembles Friendly’s views, although both court decisions and
federal legislation have modified his ideas in important ways.
Friendly reasoned that heavy-handed review of issues already litigated in
the state courts when an individual has not presented a colorable claim of
innocence drained federal resources, prejudiced meritorious petitions (be-
cause of the vast number of frivolous ones), and did violence to the value of
finality and to respect for state courts.61 Friendly readily conceded the exis-
tence of violations of fair process so severe that no independent evidence of
innocence was necessary for federal habeas corpus review. Among these vio-
lations were breakdowns in the criminal process itself, such as racial dis-
crimination in jury selection; the existence of facts not in the record
reviewed on appeal; instances in which the state had failed to provide fair
procedures for presenting a defense; and the emergence of new rules of con-
stitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court.62 Except in these
circumstances, Friendly would have required the petitioner to affirmatively
“show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including . . . evi-
dence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become
available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt.”63
56. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
57. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 155–57 (1970).
58. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prison-
ers, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
59. Friendly, supra note 57, at 142.
60. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1813–14 (1991) (calling innocence theory
one of three paradigms that dominate the habeas literature).
61. Friendly, supra note 57, at 144–50.
62. Id. at 151–54.
63. Id. at 160.
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Dorsen provides a brief survey of Friendly’s influence on subsequent
Supreme Court case law, which took up Friendly’s concern about innocence
(pp. 218–19). While discussing decisions that rejected the availability of
habeas corpus review for convictions based on unlawful seizures and that
held that successive habeas corpus petitions should only be entertained
when a constitutional claim is coupled with a colorable showing of inno-
cence, Dorsen notes the Court’s explicit invocations of Friendly.64 One nota-
ble case that Dorsen neglects is Schlup v. Delo.65 Schlup dealt with the issue
of procedural default, whereby a habeas corpus petitioner loses his right to
have his claim heard in federal court because his failure to comply with a
state procedural rule prevented him from raising the issue in state court.66
The Schlup Court held that when a death row inmate shows that the alleged
constitutional error probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent per-
son, a federal court will excuse the default.67
Schlup is one of several cases that nod toward Friendly and innocence
theory, but its significance should not be overstated. Neither Schlup nor any
other Supreme Court case has explicitly recognized denying habeas corpus
review for an innocent person as itself a constitutional violation; the Court
has only recognized that such a claim may permit habeas corpus review even
in the face of some procedural bars.68 On several occasions, the Court has
assumed without deciding that there exists a constitutional right for an in-
nocent person not to be imprisoned for a crime she did not commit.69 Al-
though it is not necessarily inconsistent, Friendly’s argument at least seems
to imply that continued detention under such circumstances would be un-
lawful.70 Moreover, the subsequent statutory developments discussed below
have both embraced aspects of innocence theory and arguably limited the
availability of habeas corpus review beyond what Friendly would have
prescribed.
It is impossible to discuss the modern law of habeas corpus without
mentioning the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”),71 which seems to gesture toward some of Friendly’s ideas while
64. Pp. 218–19. Friendly pointed out that unlawful seizures have nothing to do with
innocence and that indeed the exclusionary rule protects the guilty. Friendly, supra note 57, at
161–62. The Supreme Court later held, citing Friendly, that habeas corpus does not provide a
remedy for convictions based on illegal seizures. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480 & n.13, 481
(1976) (citing Friendly, supra note 57).
65. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
66. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 306.
67. Id. at 326–28.
68. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1629, 1630–31 (2008)
(observing that the Supreme Court has still not recognized a freestanding constitutional claim
of innocence).
69. See, e.g., Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52,
71–72 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.).
70. See p. 215 (quoting Friendly, supra note 57, at 150).
71. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
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rejecting their full implementation in favor of a more restrictive approach to
habeas corpus review. Although Friendly was mentioned in some of the
congressional hearings leading up to AEDPA’s passage,72 the final bill re-
stricts the availability and scope of habeas review beyond what Friendly had
recommended. An early analysis of the statute argues that it abandoned the
“guilt matters” framework that Friendly championed, a conclusion with
which Dorsen largely agrees, although he notes that the statute left in place
some case law that had incorporated Friendly’s views.73
Dorsen may concede too much, as indeed certain AEDPA restrictions on
habeas corpus relief contain “innocence exceptions” that could be due to
Friendly’s influence. For example, provisions barring evidentiary hearings
on a factual claim that the petitioner had not previously brought in state
court contain an exception: such a hearing may be held if the claim either
relies on a new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court
or is based on facts the petitioner could not have previously discovered
through due diligence, and the claim establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that absent the constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have
convicted the petitioner.74 Provisions barring successive habeas corpus peti-
tions contain an identical exception for claims not brought in the earlier
petitions.75 And the Supreme Court has held that other procedural hurdles
besides the explicit exceptions regarding successive claims and evidentiary
hearings can still be overcome under AEDPA by an actual innocence claim
that meets the Schlup standard.76
Despite the text’s gestures toward innocence theory, one should not
overstate AEDPA’s adoption of a Friendlyesque position. On the one hand,
an innocence-based approach remains important even post-AEDPA because
the Supreme Court has allowed Friendly-influenced exceptions to procedu-
ral hurdles to survive, and because the statutory text itself carves out some
exceptions to procedural rules when claims of actual innocence are involved.
On the other hand, the statutory exceptions’ requirement that the facts un-
derlying the new claim show by clear and convincing evidence that no rea-
sonable jury would have convicted is a markedly higher threshold than the
72. See, e.g., Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial
Process: Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 31 (1995) (state-
ment of Daniel E. Lungren, Att’y Gen., State of California).
73. See p. 219 (quoting Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas
Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1868 (1997)).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012).
75. Id. § 2244(b)(2).
76. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931–32, 1935 (2013) (holding that inno-
cence claims can overcome procedural bars to habeas corpus review even after AEDPA and
that an innocence claim meeting the Schlup standard can overcome AEDPA’s statute of limita-
tions). The Court has explained that equitable principles have traditionally governed habeas
corpus law, that Congress was aware of this when AEDPA was enacted, and that the Court will
not construe AEDPA to eliminate courts’ equitable authority absent the clearest statutory lan-
guage. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560–61 (2010). One is hard-pressed to imagine a
more fundamental equitable interest in habeas corpus jurisprudence than actual innocence.
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“fair probability” standard that Friendly advocated.77 Moreover, the inno-
cence claim to obtain an evidentiary hearing or file successive petitions
under AEDPA must accompany either a new constitutional rule or facts pre-
viously unavailable to the petitioner. Friendly’s theory would have permitted
habeas corpus review under either of these circumstances even without a
showing of innocence.78 Dorsen’s discussion of AEDPA does not explore
these aspects of the statutory text.
Although the relevant decisionmakers may not have adopted wholesale
Friendly’s perspective on habeas, expanding Dorsen’s inquiry to include
congressional receptiveness to Friendly’s ideas reveals just how influential
these ideas have been in the development of this area of law.
C. Diversity Jurisdiction
Judge Friendly was not a big fan of diversity jurisdiction.79 The thought
of state law claims finding their way into federal courts for no reason other
than that the litigants hailed from different states was inconsistent with his
notion of the purpose federal courts served. Having hinted at diversity’s
problems in his first published article,80 Friendly became perhaps the most
forceful advocate for the virtual abolition of federal court access as a result
of diversity.81
The traditional view on the original purpose of diversity jurisdiction,
“and the one most often cited by federal judges,” is that federal court access
was needed to assuage fears that state courts would be biased against the
interests of out-of-state litigants.82 After an extensive survey of the historical
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. Of course, even when sitting in diversity cases, Friendly acquitted himself well. Fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity are required to apply the decisional law of the appropriate state.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Determining which state’s law to apply
requires applying the choice of law rules of the state in which the federal court is located.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). This can sometimes yield
quirky choice of law results, such as the following:
Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York
courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither
has thought. They have had no occasion to do so. But life, here coupled with death, casts
up new problems, and the court seised of the case is obliged, as best it can, itself to blaze
the trail of the foreign law that it has been directed to follow.
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.), vacated and
remanded in light of change in state law, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). Some, including Friendly himself,
considered these lines to be among the best in a very large body of eloquent writing, as they
simultaneously followed the law and pointed out its absurdities. See p. 315; Currie, supra note
8, at 6.
80. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
483, 510 (1928).
81. P. 320; Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts 212 n.24 (rev. ed. 1996).
82. 13E Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3601, at
13–14 (3d ed. 2009); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 55, § 5.3.2.
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materials, however, Friendly concluded that there was virtually no evidence
of state court bias against out-of-state litigants, and that a more likely expla-
nation for the grant of diversity jurisdiction was the reasonable anxiety that
state courts would systematically favor debtors over creditors and other busi-
ness interests.83 While Friendly’s theory and the traditional view are not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive, and Friendly’s position has gained some
adherents, his view does not appear to have attracted the support of most
commentators.84
Friendly displayed a deep respect for state judges during his career,
which may have made the idea of bias unseemly to him.85 Doubts about the
original justifications for diversity may have combined with Friendly’s re-
spect for state courts to later convince him that the federal courts were no
place for diversity actions. Friendly’s biggest concern was the difficulty that
diversity cases may present when federal judges are called on to clarify a
complex body of state law.86 He believed that among a judge’s most impor-
tant duties was the duty to bring order and clarity to doctrine, and it was a
waste to use judicial resources to resolve state issues while delaying an au-
thoritative decision on the matter by state courts.87 Friendly thought that
federal jurisdiction should be limited to “tasks which are appropriate to
courts, which are best handled by courts of general rather than specialized
jurisdiction, and where the knowledge, tenure and other qualities of federal
judges can make a distinctive contribution.”88 Allowing federal courts, based
on diversity jurisdiction, to decide issues of state law that state judges were
presumably more competent to adjudicate fits poorly within that frame-
work, particularly for someone who doubts the existence of the type of bias
thought to justify diversity in the first place.89
83. Friendly, supra note 80, at 493–99; see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis,
The Business of the Supreme Court 8–10 (Transaction Publishers ed. 2007) (1928).
84. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, § 5.3.2.
85. Dorsen contends that Friendly’s confidence may have been based in part on the fact
that Friendly’s greatest exposure to the state courts was to elite New York judges, as opposed to
state judges in the South during the civil rights era, when many could reasonably have ques-
tioned the fairness of state judges. P. 325; see also Friendly, supra note 57, at 165 n.125
(describing his exposure to the work of “the excellent state courts of New York, Connecticut,
and Vermont”).
86. See Friendly, supra note 20, at 142–43.
87. See id. Moreover, Friendly argued that diversity cases strained the federal docket. Id.
at 141. To this day, diversity cases make up a significant proportion of the work of lower
federal courts. See Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2011 Annual Re-
port of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts 125 tbl.C-2
(2012) (showing that over 100,000 of the 289,252 civil filings in the federal district courts in
2011 were predicated on diversity of citizenship). Interestingly, the number of diversity cases
declined by fifteen percent from 2011 to 2012. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2012 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary 14 (2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2012year-endreport.pdf.
88. Friendly, supra note 20, at 13–14.
89. See id. at 142 (noting that Friendly joins the chorus of voices against diversity juris-
diction). Importantly, Friendly did not call for total abolition of diversity jurisdiction. Rather,
he thought that courts should maintain alienage jurisdiction to provide a federal forum for
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Friendly’s position remains a point of sharp contention in the academic
literature. Often commentators concede some of Friendly’s concerns but
prefer other, more modest reforms. For example, Professor Shapiro con-
tends that diversity may be more or less useful in different judicial districts
and that each district should independently determine whether to continue,
abolish, or otherwise modify the jurisdiction.90 And Judge Posner argues that
abolishing diversity jurisdiction might overburden the state courts and sug-
gests instead that it be limited to those few cases where state court bias
might be a legitimate concern. He also recommends that federal courts raise
their fees.91
Not only have Friendly’s proposals for reform been tempered by aca-
demics but they have also failed to gain traction in Congress. Congress has
never accepted Friendly’s advice to limit significantly the reach of diversity
jurisdiction, although it has raised the amount-in-controversy necessary for
federal jurisdiction a number of times to the current requirement of more
than $75,000.92 Friendly’s failure to prevail on this issue may reflect a general
lack of effective communication between Congress and the courts,93 or it
may just reflect Congress’s differing judgment.94
Friendly’s mixed record of success in having his views adopted by
courts, legislatures, and academics does not suggest that his work was any
less influential than Dorsen thinks. On the contrary, by paying more careful
attention to Friendly’s impact on congressional and academic views than
Dorsen does, one may view Friendly as even more influential than Dorsen
argues. Federal jurisdiction, like many fields of law, continues to bear the
stamp of Friendly’s ideas, even if these ideas do not now hold sway. As an-
other reviewer points out, Friendly did not have an easily digestible ap-
proach to the law.95 The fact that his influence is still being felt over twenty-
five years after his death is a testament to the grace and persuasive power
with which he reasoned.
Conclusion
Henry Friendly is an engaging look at the life of one of the federal judi-
ciary’s best; it is also a valuable introduction to the many areas of law that
the judge affected. This Notice suggests that Friendly may have been more
influential than Dorsen contends, as judges, legislators, and academics have
claims that might affect foreign relations. He also thought that courts should maintain the
interpleader rule, presumably because of the complexity of such litigation. See id. at 149–50.
90. David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 317, 339–40 (1977).
91. Posner, supra note 81, at 291–92.
92. Wright et al., supra note 82, § 3601, at 7.
93. Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in Judges and Legislators 7, 7–11
(Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
94. See Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 Green Bag 2d 111, 111 (2012).
95. See Adrian Vermeule, Local Wisdom, New Republic (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.tnr.
com/book/review/henry-friendly-supreme-court-david-dorsen (reviewing Henry Friendly).
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grappled with his ideas in ways that go beyond emulating him in his deci-
sions and judicial style. Dorsen should nevertheless be commended for his
superlative study of the life and labor of Henry Jacob Friendly, the greatest
judge of his era.
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